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The Rise of the Chinese Security State*
Yuhua Wang† and Carl Minzner‡
Abstract
Over the past two decades, the Chinese domestic security apparatus has
expanded dramatically. “Stability maintenance” operations have become a
top priority for local Chinese authorities. We argue that this trend goes
back to the early 1990s, when central Party authorities adopted new govern-
ance models that differed dramatically from those of the 1980s. They
increased the bureaucratic rank of public security chiefs within the Party
apparatus, expanded the reach of the Party political-legal apparatus into a
broader range of governance issues, and altered cadre evaluation standards
to increase the sensitivity of local authorities to social unrest. We show that
the origin of these changes lies in a policy response to the developments of
1989–1991, namely the Tiananmen democracy movement and the collapse
of communist political systems in Eastern Europe. Over the past twenty
years, these practices have developed into an extensive stability maintenance
apparatus, whereby local governance is increasingly oriented around the
need to respond to social unrest, whether through concession or repression.
Chinese authorities now appear to be rethinking these developments, but the
direction of reform remains unclear.
Keywords: security state; China; stability maintenance; political legal
committee; public security
Over the past two decades, the Chinese domestic security apparatus has expanded
dramatically. “Stability maintenance” (weiwen 维稳) operations have become a
top priority for local Chinese authorities. Public security chiefs have risen in bur-
eaucratic influence, funding and personnel for state operations aimed at control-
ling citizen petitioners and social protest have increased, and control of the
institutions responsible for addressing these issues has been vested in progres-
sively more senior Party authorities.
However, China remains far from being a simple police state. Although state
authorities harass, detain and arrest individuals they deem a threat to their rule
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and vast numbers of state agents and informally recruited personnel have been
employed to keep watch over selected political dissidents, citizen activists and
public interest lawyers, heightened official sensitivity to social unrest has also
led to state concessions to mobilized groups of aggrieved citizens and has facili-
tated strategies of “rightful resistance” among petitioners.
This article argues that the birth of these trends dates back to the early 1990s, when
central Party authorities adopted new governance models that differed dramatically
from those of the 1980s. They increased the bureaucratic rank of public security
chiefs within the Party apparatus, expanded the reach of the Party political-legal
apparatus into a broader range of governance issues, and altered cadre evaluation
standards to increase the sensitivity of local authorities to social unrest and citizen
protest. We argue that the origin of these changes lies in a policy response to the
developments of 1989–1991, namely the Tiananmen democracy movement and the
collapse of communist political systems in Eastern Europe. Over the past twenty
years, these practices have developed into an extensive weiwen apparatus, whereby
local governance is increasingly oriented around the need to respond to social unrest,
whether through concession or repression. Chinese authorities now appear to be
rethinking these developments, but the direction of reform remains unclear.
The past two decades have witnessed increased domestic unrest in China, des-
pite a growing economy and rising living standards. Protests, such as those over
land seizures or environmental grievances, generally target the specific actions of
local officials. Rarely is the legitimacy of the Party-state itself directly challenged.
While the literature on such protests has flourished, there remains limited schol-
arship on how China’s coercive institutions have responded to these challenges.1
We join a rising scholarly interest in coercive institutions in China, but our
approach is distinctive in focusing on Party-state leaders and the internal organ-
ization of the Chinese bureaucracy.2
Beyond China, we also speak to the broader literature on authoritarian
regimes. There has been a long tradition in the social sciences of viewing coercion
as the pillar of model nation states.3 The recent uprisings in the Arab world have
again called attention to the dependence of authoritarian regimes on coercive
organizations. The loyalty of such organizations is said to explain the survival
of the Bahraini monarchy, while the defection of the military contributed to
the breakdown of autocratic rule in Tunisia and Egypt.4
However, our study argues that the response of the authoritarian Chinese
regime to the “survival dilemma” goes beyond simply ratcheting up the use of
coercion.5 Chinese authorities have remodelled the internal bureaucratic
1 For examples of studies on protest in China, see O’Brien and Li 2006; Chen 2012.
2 See Shambaugh 2002; Tanner, Murray Scott, and Green 2007; Guo 2012; Deng and O’Brien 2013 on
coercive institutions in China.
3 Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979; North 1990.
4 Bellin 2012.
5 The “survival dilemma” refers to the difficulty authoritarian rulers face when simultaneously minimiz-
ing threats from the elites and from the masses. See Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Svolik 2012.
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organization of the Party-state apparatus, incentivized local authorities to
respond aggressively to citizen protests (whether through repression or conces-
sion), and reworked the Party political-legal apparatus to address citizen grie-
vances in a more flexible and coordinated manner.
Our research is based on both quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Quantitatively, we manually constructed a database of Chinese political-legal
leaders. It covers all chairpersons of national and provincial political-legal com-
mittees (the Party institutions charged with oversight of domestic security opera-
tions), as well all public security heads, procuratorate presidents and court
presidents serving on these committees from 1978 to 2013.6 The database
includes variables measuring the Party bureaucratic positions concurrently held
by these leaders. Qualitatively, we conducted a close reading of government
and Party documents (including the public speeches of Qiao Shi 乔石, Party
political-legal head during the late 1980s and early 1990s) to explain relevant
changes in these bureaucratic practices.
The following section details our quantitative data collection methods. The art-
icle continues by offering a descriptive analysis of the rank of political-legal lea-
ders at both national and local levels. It then identifies the early 1990s as a
turning point in the development of the political-legal apparatus and provides
an historical analysis of relevant shifts. We then examine recent developments
and discuss the possible implications of our findings. The last section then con-
cludes with a summary of our findings and the broader implications of the study.
The Data
We constructed our Chinese Legal Leaders Database in three steps. First, we used
theChina LawYearbooks (Zhongguo falü nianjian中国法律年鉴) published by the
China Law Society to identify Chinese national and provincial political-legal lea-
ders, such as Party political-legal committee chairs, public security heads, court
presidents and procuratorate presidents. This produced a list of names for the per-
iod 1986–2010. We supplemented this list with web searches, which extended
coverage to 1978–2013. Second, we conducted internet searches for the biograph-
ies of these leaders. Baidu Encyclopedia (baidu baike百度百科) contains informa-
tion for most leaders, including their age, gender, education, and most
importantly, working history.7 Where insufficient information was available, add-
itional internet searches of newspapers and other websites were employed to find
the missing information. Third, we coded the leaders’ bureaucratic ranks accord-
ing to their concurrent positions. This coding scheme produced nine variables that
are presented below. Examples include whether a provincial political-legal
committee chairperson or high court president is on the provincial Chinese
6 Our data reflects the most recent developments after the CCP’s 18th Party Congress.
7 For example, http://baike.baidu.com/subview/689642/4982664.htm?fr=aladdin. Accessed 24 March
2015.
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Communist Party (CCP) standing committee, and whether a provincial public
security chief chairs the provincial political-legal committee.
National and Local Trends
According to some media reports, the expansion of China’s domestic security
apparatus in recent years is largely the result of one man: Zhou Yongkang
周永康, Politburo Standing Committee member and head of the central Party
political-legal committee (PLC) from 2007 to 2012. The reports claim that
Zhou capitalized on central fears of domestic unrest and employed his dual posi-
tions to build his own personal fiefdom in the political-legal arena.8 There is an
element of truth in this. The bureaucratic influence of Party political-legal
authorities has indeed risen in recent years, as illustrated by Table 1, which
lists the Party rank held by the chairman of the central Party PLC. In the
mid-1990s, the central Party PLC was chaired by a member of the 350-person
Party Central Committee; this is in sharp contrast to Zhou Yongkang’s stature
as one of nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee. However, explain-
ing the rise of the political-legal apparatus as an artefact of Zhou’s twin roles as a
Politburo Standing Committee member and head of the central Party PLC is
problematic for several reasons.
First, Zhou is not the first Politburo Standing Committee member to chair the
central Party PLC. Luo Gan 罗干 held the same positions from 2002 to 2007
(after serving on the 25-person Politburo from 1998 to 2002). During the
1980s, Qiao Shi also served as a Politburo Standing Committee member and
Party political-legal head. Furthermore, Qiao presided over the relatively more
liberal period from 1988 to 1990, when reformist Party leaders actually dissolved
(at least in name) the national Party PLC in a partial effort at decoupling Party
and state government institutions. The expansion of the security state adminis-
tered by the political-legal apparatus is thus not simply an outgrowth of the
Party rank of the person heading the organization.
Second, it is unclear that the bureaucratic influence of the political-legal appar-
atus has actually changed that much over the past three decades. Figure 1 depicts
the percentage of chairmen of provincial Party PLCs who simultaneously held a
position on the provincial standing committee from the beginning of the reform
period to the present. We find that, with a limited exception in the 1980s, the
heads of provincial Party PLCs have almost always been on the provincial stand-
ing committee. Regardless of shifts in national politics, PLCs have consistently
been at the core of governance at the provincial level.
Another possible narrative explanation for the rise in the domestic security
apparatus focuses on slightly longer term trends. Minzner has argued that central
8 Reuters. 2012. “Exclusive: China considers downgrading domestic security tsar in next line-up,” 29
August, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/29/us-china-politics-security-idUSBRE87S1F020120829.
Accessed 7 October 2013.
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Party attitudes underwent a shift between 2003 and 2005. Social stability emerged
as a top Party priority, leading national authorities to backtrack on a range of
legal reforms that they had launched in the 1980s and 1990s – reforms that
had emphasized law, litigation, courts and a professional judiciary.9 Similarly,
Wang has identified the extent to which changed official bureaucratic practices
Table 1: Party Rank of National Political-Legal Committee Chair (1980–2014)
Name Period Party Rank
Peng Zhen 彭真 1980–1982 Politburo member
Chen Pixian 陈丕显 1982–1985 Central Committee member
Qiao Shi 乔石 1985–1992 1985–1987: Politburo member
1987–1992: Politburo Standing Committee member
Ren Jianxin 任建新 1992–1998 Central Committee member
Luo Gan 罗干 1998–2007 1998–2002: Politburo member
2002–2007: Politburo Standing Committee member
Zhou Yongkang周永康 2007–2012 Politburo Standing Committee member
Meng Jianzhu 孟建柱 2012– Politburo member
Source:
Chinese Legal Leaders Database.
Figure 1: Proportion of Provincial Political Legal Committee Chairs on Provincial
CCP Standing Committee (1978–2013)
Source:
Chinese Legal Leaders Database.
Notes:
A value of 1.0 indicates that every provincial Party political-legal head is simultaneously a member of the provincial standing
committee.
9 Minzner 2011.
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resulted in a significant increase in the percentage of police chiefs being repre-
sented in Party provincial leadership teams after 2005.10
Both of the above analyses rely less on individuals (i.e. Zhou Yongkang) to
explain changes in Party political-legal and domestic security practices. Instead,
they focus on broader structural explanations. The failure of Chinese leaders to
undertake meaningful institutional reform has led to the growth of social unrest
(citizen petitions and riots) as a regularized form of political expression. Over the
past decade, this has spurred Party leaders to expand the domestic security appar-
atus and raise its bureaucratic profile as a means to handle building tensions.
We continue to adhere to the above narrative. But, three decades of data on the
chairmen of provincial Party PLCs (charged with managing the courts, procura-
torates and police) and provincial standing committees (the top Party institution
in each province) now permit us to supplement it with an analysis of internal bur-
eaucratic dynamics within Chinese provincial Party institutions to a degree
unknown in the prior literature.
Two figures illustrate our key findings. Figure 2 depicts the percentages of pro-
vincial Party PLC chairmen who simultaneously hold the position of court presi-
dent, procuratorate president, or public security bureau (PSB) head.
Since the early 1990s, there has been a clear shift in the bureaucratic weight of
the different entities within the political-legal apparatus. In the 1980s, provincial
Party PLCs were just as likely to be chaired by court or procuratorate presidents
as by the head of the provincial public security bureau. That trend ended in the
early 1990s. PSB heads began to dominate provincial PLCs, while the numbers of
court and procuratorate heads chairing provincial PLCs dropped to almost zero.
Such trends suggest an increase in the relative influence and power of public
security chiefs, and a parallel decline in the influence and power of court and pro-
curatorate heads.
Figure 3 examines this trend through a different lens – the percentage of pro-
vinces that had the heads of the courts, procuratorate or PSB represented at the
highest institution of Party governance in the province – the provincial standing
committee. In the 1980s, provincial PSB heads were only somewhat more likely
to be on the provincial standing committee as their court or procuratorate coun-
terparts. Again, that trend decisively ended in the early 1990s. Fewer court and
procuratorate heads were appointed to provincial standing committees, while
more and more PSB heads came in.
Since the heads of Party PLCs are almost always represented on provincial
standing committees, the two graphs largely parallel each other. However,
Figure 3 does help to explain one intriguing facet of Figure 2 – the decline in
numbers of PSB heads chairing Party PLCs in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Rather than indicating a significant decline in the bureaucratic stature of the
PSB, it reflects the fact that central authorities allowed some PSB heads to
10 Wang 2014.
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serve on the standing committee entirely apart from their chairmanship of the
Party PLCs. Thus, although numbers of PSB chiefs chairing Party PLCs
declined, there was a much more modest decline in their representation on pro-
vincial standing committees.11
The Turning Point
The above data suggests that the key shift in state policies with regard to domestic
security took place not in the past five years, or even in the past ten years.
Instead, the turning point appears to have occurred in the early 1990s. Central
authorities seem to have adopted a qualitatively different strategy for managing
political-legal institutions around that point. Marrying a bureaucratic and
descriptive analysis of state security strategies both before and after this date
with the above data helps to elaborate this shift.
At the beginning of the reform period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, central
authorities re-established Party PLCs, which had collapsed along with other
Figure 2: Percentage of Provincial Public Security Heads, Procuratorate
Presidents, and Court Presidents Heading the Provincial Political Legal
Committee (1978–2013)
Source:
Chinese Legal Leaders Database.
Notes:
These numbers do not total 100%, since it is also possible that a political-legal committee chairperson chairing neither the court,
procuratorate or PSB might head the PLC.
(colour online)
11 The post-2006 decline in numbers of PSB heads chairing provincial PLCs, and its implications, are
addressed in the concluding section of this article.
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formal institutions of governance during the internal chaos and political radical-
ism of the previous two decades. Their roles included supervising the courts, pro-
curatorate and police, coordinating policy in the legal arena, and overseeing
anti-crime efforts.12
During the 1980s, two different strategies contended for influence regarding
how Party political-legal leaders should conduct these efforts. The first, “compre-
hensive management of public security” (shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili社会治安综合
治理) (CMPS hereafter), emerged in the late 1970s. CMPS emphasized the coor-
dinated response to crime and social unrest through a broad range of government
and social organs. This went beyond the simple mobilization of the police, pro-
curatorate and courts to arrest, prosecute and jail offenders; it also involved
enlisting individual workplaces or schools, assigning them responsibility for con-
trolling their students or workers, and tailoring responses to the circumstances of
each individual involved.13
Such efforts employed responsibility systems (gangwei mubiao guanli zeren zhi
岗位目标管理责任制) to accomplish these goals.14 For officials, such systems set
concrete target goals linked to official salaries and career advancement.15 Annual
Figure 3: Percentage of Provincial Public Security Heads, Procuratorate
Presidents, and Court Presidents on the Provincial CCP Standing Committee
(1978–2013)
Source:
Chinese Legal Leaders Database.
(colour online)
12 Zhou 2012; Hou 2013.
13 Qiao 2012, 55–76; Tanner, Harold M. 1999, 66–72.
14 Tanner, Harold M. 1994, 290–91.
15 Minzner 2009.
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bonuses received by the police, for example, were tied to their rates of success in
resolving cases within their jurisdictions.16 However, such systems were not
limited to cadres. They were also used to reinvigorate rural policing strategies
that relied on the participation of civilians. Villagers – either individually or in
groups – would sign responsibility contracts with their village committee and
township public security organs for maintaining security in a given target area.
Such contracts specified designated financial rewards and inducements for suc-
cess or failure in accomplishing the given tasks.17
Such efforts contrasted with earlier policies. China in the 1950s and 1960s
relied on a classic combination of Maoist strategies to maintain social order.
Public security bureaus, and the local Party authorities who supervised them,
heavily emphasized ideological incentives to motivate cadres, rectification cam-
paigns and populist “mass line” policies to pre-empt organized protest, and
campaign-style policing characterized by crackdowns of short, sharp duration
to suppress criminal activity.18
But, if CMPS policies marked a departure from Maoist populism and political
mobilization, they represented a partial revival of yet earlier bureaucratic prac-
tices. Imperial Chinese authorities had relied on regular performance evaluations
of local magistrates, tied to promotions and salaries, to manage a sprawling bur-
eaucracy. And, as early as the Song dynasty, imperial authorities had formalized
the use of village collective responsibility pacts (baojia保甲) as a governance tool
to maintain social order.
During the 1980s, however, CMPS remained relatively embryonic and undefined.
As Harold Tanner notes, economic reform meant that many private entrepreneurs,
migrant workers and the urban unemployed were increasingly living outside of the
formal work-unit structure, which undermined the thrust of CMPS efforts.19 In
addition, responsibility systems themselves generated perverse incentives. Surveys
conducted in the late 1980s revealed that large numbers of local police, faced
with high quotas for resolving criminal cases, simply failed to report crime in an
effort to skew their statistics and thus enhance their evaluations.20
A second, alternative method of social management consisted of “strike hard”
(yanda严打). This consisted of highly mediatized anti-crime crackdowns of spe-
cified durations, pursued with techniques drawn from Maoist political cam-
paigns. In 1983, after a series of brutal and high profile crimes, Deng Xiaoping
邓小平 personally pushed central authorities to prioritize such campaign-style
strategies.21 The 1983–86 “strike hard” campaign followed. It was characterized
16 Dutton 2005, 277–282.
17 Tanner, Harold M. 1994, 292.
18 Dutton 2005, 258.
19 Tanner, Harold M. 1999, 70–71.
20 Dutton 2005, 282.
21 Tanner, Murray Scott 2000, 98–108; Xinhuanet. 2005. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu yanli daji xing-
shi fanzui huodong de jueding” (CCP Central Committee decision regarding striking hard against crim-
inal activity), 25 August 1983, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/07/content_2558498.htm.
Accessed 7 October 2013.
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by mass arrests, rapid sentencing procedures and high execution rates – with per-
haps as many as 10,000 persons executed in a three-year period.22
As a social control strategy, “strike hard” policies required Party political-legal
committees focused on the procuratorate, courts and police to coordinate their
activities to deliver results. In the mid-1980s, authorities brought together
court, procuratorate and police officials to staff “command posts” and carry
out the “joint handling” of cases.23 This facilitated the extremely rapid processing
of cases. In one example, only 15 days elapsed between the arrest of a suspect and
his execution.24 Naturally, the combination of campaign political pressure and
the erosion of bureaucratic boundaries between state organs resulted in sweeping
procedural abuses.25 State authorities themselves voiced concerns regarding such
abuses (particularly during the 1983–86 campaign) and the tendency for cam-
paigns to degenerate into routinized bursts of enforcement, which were invariably
followed by a resurgence in criminal activity.26
The dramatic events of 1989 prompted a reset in state management of crime
and social unrest in China, which led to the emergence of CMPS as the primary
social control strategy and the decline (albeit gradual) in reliance on “strike hard”
policies. This shift is reflected both in relevant central Party directives and the
speeches of Qiao Shi, the Politburo Standing Committee member heading the
political-legal affairs committee at the time.
In 1990, Party authorities re-established the central Party PLC, which had been
abolished (at least in name) during Zhao Ziyang’s 赵紫阳 abortive two-year
experiment with political reform during the late 1980s. However, central leaders
did not immediately promulgate a new strategy for the re-established PLC.
Instead, they carried out short-lived “strike hard” campaigns, such as the “six
evils” (liu hai 六害), in late 1989 and 1990.27
This changed in January 1991. At a central Party conference attended by all
provincial political-legal heads and the representatives of 30 other organizations,
Qiao Shi spelled out a new direction for Party political-legal work in a series of
speeches highlighting the need to respond to the political events of the previous
two years, including the unravelling of communist political systems in Eastern
Europe and the USSR, the 1989 student democracy protest movement, and ten-
sions in ethnic autonomous regions.28
Despite rhetorical support for continuing “strike hard” policies, Qiao’s
speeches marked a clear shift in favour of CMPS: “As to the relationship between
‘strike hard’ and comprehensive management of social stability… while adhering
to ‘strike hard,’ more prominence needs to be given to comprehensive
22 Tanner, Harold M. 1999, 99.
23 Ibid., 87; Trevaskes 2007, 124.
24 Dutton 2005.
25 Tanner, Murray Scott 2000.
26 Trevaskes 2007, 159–164.
27 Biddulph 2007, 137; Qiao 2012, 218–220.
28 Qiao 2012, 221–252.
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management of social stability.”29 Qiao emphasized that “strike hard” needed to
be increasingly localized – with campaigns directed by individual local authorities
in response to the specific problems they faced. In contrast, CMPS was to be
adopted as a long-term, nationwide strategy, pursued under the leadership of a
central body and demanding the support of all Party authorities. Such proposals
were not entirely new. As early as 1986, in an indirect criticism of the just-
concluded nationwide “strike hard” campaign, Qiao had called for greater
emphasis on CMPS strategies, heightened use of responsibility systems tied to
the salaries and promotions of local officials, and the creation of a more coordi-
nated Party-led CMPS apparatus.30
Now, however, Qiao’s words translated into immediate shifts in policy. Less
than a month after the conclusion of the January 1991 conference, the Central
Party Committee and State Council issued a joint directive on strengthening
the comprehensive management of public security.31 The directive set
CMPS as a national priority. It established a central Committee for the
Comprehensive Management of Public Security to manage these efforts and
coordinate state responses to social unrest and crime. Furthermore, it ordered
the creation of CMPS branches at the county level and higher, and the establish-
ment of CMPS “leadership organs” at the township and village levels.
These policies reshaped Party governance in two critical ways. First, they
expanded the portfolio of Party political-legal heads. The 1991 directive clearly
placed CMPS work under the auspices of Party PLCs, explicitly co-locating
CMPS committees in the same offices with Party PLCs. Unsurprisingly, in the
past two decades, every national chair of the Party PLC has also chaired the
national CMPS committee. Where 1980s-era Party political-legal authorities
were tasked with managing the courts, procuratorates and police, their successors
have found themselves additionally charged with coordinating (through the
CMPS committees) a much wider web of governmental activity surrounding
crime and social unrest. Comparing the membership of the two institutions illus-
trates this point. In 2007, the central Party PLC consisted of five entities: the
Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of
Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Justice. In
the same year, the membership of the national CMPS committee consisted of
over 40 organizations, including the five above, but also the National Tourism
Agency, the People’s Bank of China, the State Ministry of Work Safety, the
Ministry of Personnel, and the People’s Liberation Army.
The 1991 decision had a second effect as well. It explicitly raised social stability
to a core place within internal Party cadre evaluation policies. It instructed Party
29 Ibid., 246–252.
30 Ibid., 50–54.
31 “Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili de jueding” (CCP
Central Committee, State Council decision regarding strengthening the comprehensive management
of public security), 2 February 1991, http://www.alt.gov.cn/Article/ShowArticle.aspx?ArticleID=
38470. Accessed 10 October 2013.
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leaders at all levels to construct CMPS target responsibility systems tied to the sal-
ary and career promotion prospects for local leaders. These were to be “fused with
responsibility systems for economic development” that had developed in the 1980s.
Further, CMPS social order targets were also to be granted status as “priority tar-
gets with veto power” (yipiao foujue一票否决), which means that failure to attain
them could cancel out an official’s positive work performance in other fields.32
Subsequent implementing opinions required relevant organization bureau officials
to solicit the input of CMPS leaders in personnel advancement decisions.33
Of course, policy changes at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy did not gen-
erate sweeping changes in internal practices overnight. There were renewed
national “strike hard” campaigns in 1996, 2001 and 2010.34 Implementation dif-
ficulties hampered central efforts to build a CMPS institutional framework. In
1996, for example, central CMPS authorities issued directives complaining of
the laxity of local Party authorities, and demanding that they devote more atten-
tion to constructing the required CMPS institutions – particularly at the township
and village levels.35
However, the early 1990s did mark a “critical juncture,” unleashing a gradual
evolution in official strategies of social control.36 The three subsequent national
“strike hard” campaigns were of a lesser duration and intensity compared with
the campaign waged between 1983 and 1986. The seven-month long 2010 cam-
paign, for example, was restricted to the public security apparatus, with limited
participation from judicial organs.37
Bureaucratic institutions gradually expanded in the wake of shifts in central
policies. Authorities began to work social stability considerations into relevant
evaluations of local officials. Numbers of CMPS personnel grew and their
responsibilities ballooned. For example, central Party directives issued in 2001
specified that private enterprises should be brought into the CMPS web and
should assume responsibility for incidents of crime and social unrest committed
32 Ibid.
33 Chinalawedu.com. 1993. “Guanyu shixing shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili lingdao zerenzhi de ruo gan gui-
ding” (Relevant rules on implementing responsibility systems for cadres in leadership positions regard-
ing the comprehensive management of public security), 14 November, http://www.chinalawedu.com/
news/1200/22598/22604/22705/22727/2006/3/hu76623740361813600221855-0.htm. Accessed 10 October
2013.
34 Biddulph 2007, 134–35; Trevaskes 2007, 187–89.
35 Chinalawedu.com. 1996. “Zhongyang shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili weiyuanhui guanyu jiaqiang shehui
zhi’an zonghe zhili jiceng gongzuo de yijian” (Opinion of the Central Committee for the comprehensive
management of public security regarding strengthening grassroots work), 7 November, http://www.
chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/fg22598/36434.shtml. Accessed 10 October 2013.
36 At critical junctures, events set a specific trajectory of institutional development and consolidation that
become increasingly difficult to reverse. See Collier and Collier 1991. We do not argue that after 1991
the trend was irreversible, but once Chinese authorities began to build up the weiwen apparatus as the
primary institutional means to deal with social protest, it became progressively difficult to alter course.
The weiwen apparatus itself began to acquire larger and larger entrenched interests (money, power),
while citizens themselves become increasingly incentivized to behave in a particular way (increasingly
disruptive protests). Since 1991, the two trends have begun to feed on each other in an increasingly
vicious cycle.
37 Xie 2013, 53; Xie 2012, 7.
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within their ranks.38 By the late 1990s, when Party authorities established specia-
lized offices to deal with emerging concerns (such as social stability (weiwen)
offices to respond to outbreaks of unrest, or the “610” anti-cult departments to
deal with organizations deemed heretical39), these were invariably grouped
with the CMPS offices under the purview of Party political-legal authorities.
As these institutions evolved, their personnel, leadership and daily responsibilities
remained highly intertwined with the fused CMPS/political-legal committee
framework established in the early 1990s.40
The increased emphasis on social stability was associated with the rise in bur-
eaucratic rank of police chiefs. Local police chiefs – rather than their court or
procuratorate counterparts – managed the daily operations of the newly estab-
lished weiwen offices.41 And, in 2003, central Party authorities explicitly
instructed that provincial, municipal and county-level public security organs
should be headed by Party standing committee members or deputy government
heads, thereby outranking their local government and court counterparts (and
generating the peak shown in Figure 3).42
Such developments have led to the widespread “securitization” of local govern-
ance in China. This is not without precedent. The American pursuit of the war on
terror has led an ever-expanding array of foreign policy concerns – AIDS, eco-
nomic development, information collection and monitoring – to be regarded as
challenges to be comprehensively managed through a national security lens.43
Similarly, the Chinese state’s focus on domestic stability, coupled with the
post-1991 bureaucratic shifts discussed above, have meant that an increasing
number of seemingly unconnected fields of governance, for instance, food safety,
environmental accidents and ordinary civil disputes, are being sucked into the
weiwen vortex. This has generated intense pressure on local officials. In 2013,
one Sichuan township deputy head pointed to precisely such pressures as the rea-
son for his resignation, asserting that they effectively required him to spend four
months per year carrying out weiwen work, leaving only four months to spend on
“real” government work.44
These developments have also led to increasing conflict with legal norms pro-
moted by Chinese authorities themselves. At the central level, the heavy state use
38 Xie 2013, 148
39 The “610” offices, named after the date 10 June 1999, were established to suppress the falun gong spir-
itual movement.
40 Liebman 2013; Cook and Lemish 2011.
41 Xie 2013, 145.
42 People.com.cn. 2003. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang yu gaijin gong’an gongzuo de
jueding” (Decision of the CCP Central Committee regarding further strengthening and improving public
security work), 18 November, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66691/4494638.html#.
Accessed 1 December 2011.
43 Higgott 2004.
44 Xinhuanet.com. 2013. “Fuzhenzhang wangshang fa cizhi ganyan: sigeyue weiwen sheng sigeyue gan-
zhengshi” (Deputy township secretary publishes internet statement regarding his resignation: four
months spent handling stability maintenance work leaves only four months to handle “real” work), 5
July, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-07/05/c_124959920.htm. Accessed 10 October 2013.
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of top-down responsibility systems that tie officials’ career and financial incen-
tives to their success or failure in attaining given targets (in particular, social sta-
bility targets) as a governance tool has fuelled the expansion of a “rule by
mandates” which is at odds with rule-of-law norms.45 At the local level, the sta-
bility imperative has promoted the emergence of an expansive, well-funded,
extra-legal weiwen apparatus. Faced with increasingly tough career sanctions
whenever outbreaks of citizen petitioning occur within their jurisdictions, local
Chinese authorities have resorted to both the widespread use of hired thugs to
intercept petitioners seeking to reach higher authorities and the calculated appli-
cation of pressure on petitioners’ families and friends (“relational repression”) to
convince them to give up their petitioning efforts.46
Increasing securitization of local governance contributed to the decision of
Chinese authorities to turn against their own late 20th-century legal reforms.
State efforts to promote courts, litigation and rule-of-law rhetoric gave rise (by
2003) to a cadre of Chinese public interest lawyers and advocates (such as
Chen Guangcheng 陈光诚 and Xu Zhiyong 许志永), capable of organizing
aggrieved citizens, invoking central rule-of-law language, and launching savvy
litigation and media challenges to state policies. By 2005, Party political-legal
authorities concluded that such efforts were inconsistent with the expanded
domestic stability apparatus and its aims. As a result, they have since progressive-
ly moved to close down “rhetoric (constitutionalism), channels (court trials), and
social forces (lawyers) that activists had used to mobilize for greater change.”47
Ironically, few appear to have initially appreciated the extent to which the new
bureaucratic structures and social control policies advanced in the early 1990s
would ultimately generate the levels of conflict with legal norms seen in the
last decade. At the time, some foreign criminal law experts depicted the emer-
gence of CMPS strategies as a rationalized, professionalized and desirable alter-
native to the excesses of campaign-style policing.48 Furthermore, in the 1990s, at
least some Chinese officials clearly envisaged that the domestic security shifts dis-
cussed above were consistent with legal reforms emphasizing judicial profession-
alism and greater access to the courts for aggrieved Chinese citizens. Indeed, less
than a year after Tiananmen, Qiao Shi himself advocated the adoption of the
CMPS policies described above while at the same time also saying:
Historically, it was the case that officials brought suit against citizens. [Now,] the newly imple-
mented Administrative Procedure Law authorizes citizens to bring suit against officials – this
must be regarded as an advance for democracy and the rule of law. Implementation of some
laws will increase “trouble” (mafan 麻烦). But this trouble is extremely necessary, and is bene-
ficial to better protecting citizen rights.49
45 Birney 2013; Minzner 2009; Dutton 2005. Naturally, many of these policies are themselves modern
incarnations of earlier practices found in the early PRC or imperial periods.
46 Deng and O’Brien 2013; Lam 2012.
47 Minzner 2013, 69.
48 Biddlulph 2007, 150.
49 Qiao 2012, 92 (authors’ translation).
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Recent Developments
Developments since 2012, including the dramatic fall of Politburo member, Bo
Xilai 薄熙来, the retirement (and subsequent prosecution) of his ally, Zhou
Yongkang, and Xi Jinping’s 习近平 ascension to power, have prompted some
observers to parse the tea leaves for signs of reform in the political-legal system.
Changes have indeed occurred. At the top of the system, the bureaucratic rank
of the chairman of the central Party PLC has been reduced. Unlike the period
between 2002 and 2012, the current chairman (Meng Jianzhu 孟建柱) no longer
holds a spot on the Politburo Standing Committee. There has also been a reallo-
cation of influence within provincial PLCs. In 2005, over 40 per cent of provincial
Party PLCs were chaired by provincial PSB heads. That figure has now fallen by
roughly half (Figure 3). Instead, the emerging trend appears to be vesting the
chairmanship of the provincial PLC with a designated deputy Party secretary
who heads neither the court, procuratorate or the PSB. Percentages of PLCs
chaired by deputy Party secretaries have now risen to over 20 per cent.50
How to interpret such developments? Naturally, one possibility would be to
view them as an effort to curtail the power of the Party political-legal apparatus
and weaken the security state.51 Such an interpretation would arguably be further
reinforced by Figure 3, which shows a post-2005 decline in the percentage of PSB
chiefs seated on provincial Party standing committees, from over 50 per cent to
under 40 per cent.
But our data suggests that such changes remain limited in nature. On the pro-
vincial level, there has been absolutely no change in the practice of having the
Party political-legal head represented on the provincial standing committee
(Figure 1). That trend has continued in every single province (including after
the 2012 leadership handover). Further, as Yuhua Wang has demonstrated, the
decline in PSB chiefs heading Party PLCs does not mean that their influence
has been diminished.52 Rather, it has been accompanied by a parallel trend –
an increasing number of PSB chiefs being transferred to the Party group (dangzu
党组) in the provincial government, and holding positions such as assistant to the
governor (shengzhang zhuli 省长助理) or deputy governor ( fu shengzhang 副省
长). Consequently, public security heads have not suffered a demotion in rank,
because members on the government Party group have the same bureaucratic
rank as a member on the provincial CCP standing committee, vice-ministerial
level ( fu buji 副部级).53
Instead, the key trend appears to be a steady diversification of the number of
leaders bearing responsibility for domestic stability work. Take, for example, the
50 Infzm.com. 2011. “Jianfu hou, zhuanzhi fushuji ganshenme?” (After “deputy reductions,”’ what are
full-time deputy Party secretaries doing?), 9 December, http://www.infzm.com/content/65959.
Accessed 7 October 2013.
51 BBC. 2012. “China leaders reassert control over security portfolio,” 21 November, http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-asia-china-20422303. Accessed 10 October 2013.
52 Wang 2014.
53 Ibid.
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relationship between the CMPS committees and Party PLCs. Central authorities
are in the process of separating the leadership of the two institutions. As men-
tioned above, until recently, their leadership was intertwined. The Party PLC
head would bear direct responsibility for leading the work of the courts, procur-
atorate and public security bureau, and simultaneously (in his role as head of the
CMPS committee) be charged with mobilizing, coordinating and enlisting a wide
range of other government bureaus in social stability work. Since 2011, Party lea-
ders have been dividing the leadership of these two institutions by appointing
either the provincial Party secretary or a designated deputy Party secretary as
chair of the CMPS committee, and having a separate individual head the provin-
cial Party PLC. About 15 of China’s provincial-level governments have now
adopted such a bureaucratic division of responsibilities.54 Party leaders may be
responding to (and rethinking) the expanded role that the PLCs have enjoyed
in recent years – not by reducing the bureaucratic rank of the committees, but
by dividing up the responsibilities for domestic security work among a range
of different subordinates.
The implications of such developments are unclear. On one hand, such devel-
opments might lead to the emergence of partial checks on state power. For
example, the increasing division of power within the security apparatus might
result in Party political-legal authorities losing the voice that they have enjoyed
in recent years over a range of other enforcement organs.
On the other hand, these shifts might suggest a more negative trend. Social sta-
bility appears to be migrating ever higher within the bureaucratic hierarchy as a
Party concern. Consider the general shifts over recent decades. In the 1980s, the
domestic security portfolio on provincial Party standing committees was typically
held by a Party political-legal head, who himself was not the provincial police
chief. In the 1990s, it was increasingly held by the provincial police chief serving
simultaneously as a Party standing committee member, head of the provincial
PLC and chair of the CMPS committee. That represented an intensification of
provincial security responsibilities in a single individual. Since 2006, however,
the security portfolio at the provincial Party level has increasingly taken the
form of multiple individuals – first, a Party political-legal head represented on
the Party standing committee, second, a CMPS committee head also represented
on the standing committee, and third, a provincial police chief – also represented
on the standing committee or on the Party group within the government. This
represents an intensification of security responsibilities among a greater number
of people at the provincial level.
Rather than representing a weakening of the political-legal apparatus, such devel-
opments may be another step towards escalating the “securitization” of the Chinese
54 Takunpao.com. 2012. “Zhou Yongkang zhuguan zongzhiwei bianshen yiniankao: xuanchuan lingyu
jiaqiang” (A year since the name change of the Central Committee for the Comprehensive
Management of Public Security run by Zhou Yongkang: propaganda work strengthened), 27
September, http://www.takungpao.com/news/content/2012-09/27/content_1171613.htm. Accessed 10
October 2013.
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state. As domestic security challenges have risen in importance over the past two
decades, and the weiwen apparatus has ballooned in size, the Chinese bureaucratic
state may have found it necessary to task ever-increasing numbers of senior officials
with responsibility for domestic security work. Concurrently, the domestic security
portfolio may have emerged as such a concentrated locus of power that increasingly
senior leaders find it undesirable to allow others to control it.
Developments since the 2012 leadership transition appear to bolster such an
interpretation. The Party general secretary (Xi Jinping) has emerged as the
Politburo Standing Committee member clearly responsible for the political-legal
portfolio (i.e. directly managing Meng Jianzhu) – a distinct contrast with prior
practice (Zhou Yongkang, rather than Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, running the PLC).
Moreover, at the November 2013 Party plenum, Chinese authorities announced
the creation of a new state security committee charged with supervising both for-
eign and domestic security matters and chaired by Xi Jinping himself. This repre-
sents an unusual concentration of power over the security portfolio in the hands
of China’s top leader.55
Implications
First, the rise of the Chinese security state in recent years is not merely the result
of political decisions taken by individual Party leaders. Nor is it simply the result
of social and economic dislocations caused by the process of economic reform.
Instead, the expansion of the Chinese state weiwen apparatus is the result of
the gradual accretion of power by a political-legal bureaucratic apparatus that
was significantly restructured in the wake of the dramatic events of 1989–1991
to address central Party concerns regarding social stability and domestic unrest.
Specific events over the past two decades, such as the falun gong protests of 1999,
increased citizen petitions regarding land grabs in the early 2000s, and the ascen-
sion of Luo Gan and Zhou Yongkang to the Politburo Standing Committee,
have contributed to state decisions to ratchet up the power and influence of
this apparatus. But the fundamental framework – the rise in the bureaucratic stat-
ure of the police, the emergence of social stability as a core element of cadre
evaluation mechanisms, the expanded responsibility for political-legal authorities
for coordinating state responses to social unrest across all fields of governance – is
the product of state policies taken in the early 1990s. The creation of a national
state security committee merging these functions under the direct command of
China’s top leader may simply be the latest step in a two-decade long evolution-
ary rise of the Chinese security state.
Second, these policies may themselves be partially responsible for the rise of
social unrest in China today. As others have documented, the rise in collective
55 Unlike the Soviet Union, China has traditionally not had a vertical command structure over an exten-
sive security apparatus vested directly in the top leader. Historically, Mao himself primarily relied on
mass movements, rather than the secret police, to dominate both the state leadership and society at
large. Guo 2012 11–12.
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petitions and citizen protests since the 1990s and the emergence of “rightful resist-
ance” as a strategy for popular contention have been facilitated by state sensitiv-
ity to the threat of social unrest.56 Precisely because central officials apply
pressure on local authorities (through cadre responsibility systems) to avoid all
instances of mass petitions, citizens can, and increasingly are, “gaming the sys-
tem” by tactically using the threat of organized petitioning as a tool to try to
wring concessions from local authorities in conflicts ranging from land grievances
to commercial disputes to environmental protests, often regardless of whether
their claims have underlying legal merit. These developments may be a direct out-
growth of the bureaucratic changes of the early 1990s. The decision of Chinese
authorities to expand the responsibility of political-legal leaders for coordinating
state responses to social unrest across different areas of governance and also to
increase the career sanctions on local authorities for outbreaks of social discon-
tent may have enabled the growth of social protest by altering key bureaucratic
incentives for both citizens and officials alike.
Ironically, both the rise in the Chinese state repressive apparatus and the increase
in social instability may have their roots in exactly the same government policies.
Concluding Remarks
An analysis of more than three decades of data on Chinese political-legal leaders
shows that the Chinese state has become increasingly “securitized.” The rank of
public security chiefs vis-à-vis court and procuratorate leaders has been raised
within the Party apparatus, the reach of the Party political-legal apparatus has
been expanded into a broader range of governance issues, and the incentive struc-
ture of local officials has been altered to increase the sensitivity of local author-
ities to social protest. We show that the rise of the security state can be traced
back to the early 1990s when the Party-state systematically restructured the secur-
ity apparatus as a response to the events of 1989.
We also observe a pluralization of security work in recent years. Domestic
security work in the mid-1980s largely consisted of coordinated campaigns of
court, procuratorate and police personnel led by Party PLC officials. Recent
years have seen the emergence of a more pluralized organizational structure
involving a wider net of Party, government and social institutions. In part, this
reflects the fact that an increasingly complex Chinese society is generating a
more complicated set of disputes. Individual government bureaus cannot handle
these on their own. Before 1978, labour disputes might be successfully managed
within the confines of a single state-owned enterprise. Now, handling a mass
56 O’Brien and Li 1999, 2006; Minzner 2006; Cai 2006; Chen 2012; Lorentzen 2013. This has been exacer-
bated by post-1978 policies that moved away from Maoist tactics of political mobilization, such as rec-
tification campaigns, as tools for pre-empting and addressing outbreaks of mass protest. See O’Brien
1999. As citizens lost the channels for political participation provided by regular Maoist political cam-
paigns, organized discontent began to take the form of the citizen activism discussed in the text – orga-
nized petitions and protests aimed at pushing the buttons created by the adaption of CMPS policies and
associated responsibility systems.
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protest by the employees of a construction company might require the coordin-
ation of local police, the courts, the labour bureau, labour unions and the private
enterprise – not to mention the state media and propaganda authorities (to con-
trol the dissemination of information via social media).
But the pluralization of security work also reflects the fact that, rather than
facilitating the emergence of independent institutions (such as courts) endowed
with the autonomy and legitimacy to handle such disputes, Chinese authorities
are blurring the distinction between security and non-security Party work.
Housing management bureaus ( fangwu guanliju 房屋管理局), which might not
have been considered part of the domestic security apparatus in the 1980s, are
now expected to be directly involved in settling protests arising from land sei-
zures. As one Chinese state cadre fumed after learning of directives instructing
him to prevent family and relatives from engaging in protest activity surrounding
a local construction project, at the cost of his own job, “Now, as long as you are
part of the state bureaucracy, you are part of the weiwen apparatus.”
China’s regime stability in the last 30 years is not simply the result of coercion;
it is far more. The China field has provided a wide spectrum of theories explain-
ing the macro-level stability of the regime, including the CCP’s revolutionary
tradition and cultural resources,57 institutionalization of elite politics,58 the
cadre evaluation system,59 the media,60 nationalism,61 the Party’s co-optation
strategy,62 and foreign direct investment.63 To this list, we would add the bureau-
cratic shifts within the Chinese political-legal system that the state has adopted to
respond to escalating levels of social conflict. The ultimate success or failure of
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